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Abstract
Criteria for evaluating school choice mechanisms are rst, whether truth-telling is
sometimes punished and second, how ecient the match is. With common knowledge
preferences, Deferred Acceptance (DA) dominates the Boston mechanism by the rst
criterion and is ambiguously ranked by the second. Our laboratory experiments conrm
this. A new ex ante perspective, where preferences are private information, introduces
new eciency costs borne by strategy-proof mechanisms, like DA. In a symmetric envi-
ronment, truth-telling can be an equilibrium under Boston, and Boston can rst-order
stochastically dominate DA in terms of eciency, both in theory and in the laboratory.
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1 Introduction
School districts that allow students some leeway to choose which school to attend have various
mechanisms in place to produce outcomes that match students to schools while taking student
preferences into account (see Abdulkadiro glu and S onmez 2003). In many districts schools
themselves do not have preferences over students, though students may receive diering pri-
orities at dierent schools, reecting whether they live in the walk zone or have a sibling at
the school. School choice mechanisms are judged by two criteria. The rst is that students, in
some sense, will not be penalized for truthfully revealing their preferences over schools. The
second is the eciency of the match, that is it should assign as many students as possible to
schools they like. In this paper, we examine two such mechanisms: the Boston mechanism
and the Deferred Acceptance mechanism. We take them to the laboratory to see if students
submit preference reports in a way predicted by equilibrium. Furthermore, we introduce a
broader, ex ante view of the school choice problem that casts the eciency properties of the
strategy-proof Deferred Acceptance mechanism and the manipulable Boston mechanism in a
new light. The ex ante view also suggests potentially higher eciency costs that have to be
incurred to achieve strategy-proofness than previously thought (see Abdulkadiro glu, Pathak
and Roth, forthcoming).
Some mechanisms explicitly favor students at a school if they have ranked it highly. Note
that this immediately implies that truth-telling may not be an optimal strategy. Such mech-
anisms are known as priority mechanisms and are currently used in many school districts,
such as Cambridge, Charlotte-Mecklenberg, Denver, Miami-Dade, Rochester, Tampa-St. Pe-
tersburg, and White Plains.1 A particularly extreme priority mechanism was used by Boston
Public Schools, which is where the Boston mechanism got its name (see Abdulkadiro glu and
S onmez 2003 and Abdulkadiro glu, Pathak, Roth, and S onmez 2005).
In 2005, the Boston Public Schools replaced the Boston mechanism with a student-
proposing Deferred Acceptance mechanism (DA). They did so for reasons best described by
the rst criterion that we introduced above, namely that participants should not be harmed
by submitting their preferences truthfully. Under DA, truthful revelation of the ordinal pref-
erence is a dominant strategy, while under Boston, the equilibrium prediction is often that
students will manipulate their preference reports. Multiple published sources of advice dis-
cuss strategies that yield better outcomes than truth-telling (such as not ranking unachievable
1Mechanisms that explicitly use the rank students assign to possible outcomes are also common in two-sided
matching problems, see Roth (1990) and Roth (1991).
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schools rst). These suggest that students (or parents) manipulate their preferences in the
Boston mechanism (Abdulkadiro glu, Pathak, Roth, and S onmez 2006).
Empirically, Abdulkadiro glu, Pathak, Roth, and S onmez (2006) provide some indirect
evidence that some families strategize when they report their preferences over schools, while
others seem not to and are potentially harmed by failing to do so. Student-proposing DA,
on the other hand, does not have this problem, as regardless of what other students submit,
truth-telling remains a best response. This seems to have been a key argument in convincing
the board of Boston Public Schools to switch from the Boston mechanism to student-proposing
DA.
Unfortunately, since students' true preferences are not observed in the eld, it is dicult
to directly assess any ineciency in the allocation produced by Boston. Experiments will not
only allow us to do this, but will also provide an immediate comparison to outcomes under
dierent mechanisms. Furthermore, we can study whether some types of manipulations are
more easily learned than others. The rst part of the paper is most closely related to Chen
and S onmez (2006), which shows that students manipulate submitted preferences under the
Boston mechanism (see also Pais and Pint er, 2008). In their experiments, however, players
only knew the mechanism, remaining entirely ignorant of how the preferences of the other
students were generated. This lack of information made it such that neither participants nor
researchers could tell if the observed manipulations were in equilibrium. In the present paper,
participants always receive information about the distribution of preferences, but may not
know their exact realization.
Everything we have presented thus far seems to conrm the view of the existing literature
that the Boston mechanism should simply be thrown out of the market designer's toolbag.
This result is based on the point of view that all participants (apart from the school board that
allocates school seats) know the preferences of other participants. Below, we will highlight
some positive features of the Boston mechanism as we change the perspective under which
outcomes are evaluated, specically, as we move to an ex ante viewpoint.
A second important feature of mechanisms is their eciency. Since schools are objects to
be allocated, only the welfare of students is taken into account. The existing literature on
school choice problems focuses on two views of eciency.2 The rst of these is the ex post view,
in which lottery draws and preferences of all students are common knowledge. For example,
Ergin and S onmez (2006) show the outcome of student-proposing Deferred Acceptance is
2For a summary of the literature, see e.g. S onmez and  Unver, forthcoming.
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weakly preferred to any Nash equilibrium under the Boston mechanism. A second view which
has lately received more attention is the interim view, which holds that lottery draws are not
known and should not enter eciency considerations. Erdil and Ergin (2008) point out that
DA, by using explicit tie-breakers, may result in an outcome that is not the student-optimal
stable matching given priorities only (see also Kesten and  Unver (2008) and Abdulkadiro glu,
Che and Yasuda (2008)). While they provide a mechanism to improve upon the DA outcome,
Abdulkadiro glu, Pathak and Roth (forthcoming) show that any mechanism that improves
upon the DA outcome is not strategy-proof. They also try to estimate the costs of strategy-
proofness, albeit still from the view that all student preferences are given.
This paper stresses a dierent view of school choice problems which holds that students,
while aware of their own preferences, do not know the preferences of other students, and
instead are only aware of their underlying distribution. In this ex ante viewpoint, additional
potential gains can be reaped by allowing trade-os across dierent realizations of preferences.
Furthermore, incentives to manipulate preferences change as well.3
Specically, we will show that there are some special environments where, from the ex
ante viewpoint, truth-telling is not only an equilibrium under DA, but also under the Boston
mechanism. What's more, in those environments the Boston mechanism can (ex ante) yield
outcomes that rst-order stochastically dominate those of DA for every student.
It remains an empirical question whether the theoretical advantages of the Boston mech-
anism can be realized in practice. One possible hurdle could be that students are more likely
to submit preferences truthfully when doing so is not merely a Bayesian equilibrium strategy
(as under Boston), but is a dominant strategy (as under DA). We will show that the gains of
the Boston mechanism can be realized not only in theory, but also in practice.
2 The Theory
2.1 The School Choice Problem
We start with a set of n students, I  fi1;:::;ing, and a set of m schools, S  fs1;:::;smg.
Each school s has a corresponding capacity qs. Additionally, each student i has a strict
preference, Pi, over the elements of S and the outcome of being unmatched. Student i has
3The ex ante viewpoint has been used in the two-sided matching literature when discussing strategic
incentives to manipulate reported preferences, see e.g. Roth and Rothblum 1999, Erdil and Ergin 2008 and
Kojima and Pathak (forthcoming). This viewpoint has, however, been absent in the school choice literature
and when comparing eciency properties of various mechanisms.
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an associated vector of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, Vi.
Schools do not have preferences in the same way, as they are merely objects to be allocated.4
Instead, they are endowed with a weak priority ordering over students, denoted as SCs, which
is based on student characteristics. The school \preferences" are a way to encode the privileges
that certain students might have due to their characteristics. For example, in Boston, SCs
is based on whether a student is within walking distance of s or has a sibling at s (see
Abdulkadiro glu and S onmez, 2003). Because SCs is a weak ordering, sometimes a school
will need to decide between two students over whom it is indierent. For these tie-breaking
decisions, each school s has a uniform lottery Ls, which provides a strict ordering over students.
For most purposes, Ls is either drawn independently of Ls0 for all schools s and s0 (multiple
lotteries) or is drawn once and used as the tie-breaker for all schools (single lottery).
The weak \preferences" of schools can be extended to strict \preferences" via a lexi-
cographic ordering that considers Ls whenever SCs is indierent. We denote this \con-
structed" ordering by s SCs  Ls. A realized school choice problem is dened by
fI;S;fPigi2I;fqsgs2S;fSCsgs2Sg (a cardinal version of this concept replaces fPigi2I with
fVigi2I).
A general school choice problem is a probability distribution ' over realized school
choice problems, where the uncertainty is over fPigi2I. That is, the identity of students, and
their student characteristics are known, but the particular preferences of each student are
drawn according to the distribution ' over possible P = P1  ::  Pn. This is analogously
done for cardinal preferences.
A school choice matching  : I 7! S [ I is a function such that (i) for all i 2 I,
if (i) = 2 S, then (i) = i, and (ii) for all s 2 S, it must be that jfi : (i) = sgj  qs.5
A pair (i;s) 2 I  S blocks matching  with respect to SCs if sPi (i) and one or
more of the following is true: (i) There is some j with (j) = s such that iSCs j, or (ii)
jfi : (i) = sgj < qs. A student i is said to block a matching  if iPi (i). A matching  is
stable with respect to SCs if there is no individual, and no pair that blocks the matching
with respect to SCs. A direct revelation school choice mechanism is a function that
maps reported student preferences fe Pigi2I and \constructed" school preferences fsgs2S to
a school-choice matching, .6
4Note that schools are constrained to nd all students acceptable.
5We denote the outcome where student i is unmatched as (i) = i.
6Note that school preferences are not submitted by the schools, but rather they are codied by adminis-
trative rules. Schools have no chance to behave strategically.
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We are primarily interested in examining the eciency and incentive properties of direct
revelation school choice mechanisms. This can be done from three perspectives. We describe
the scenarios in which students only know ordinal preferences; the case of cardinal preferences
is constructed analogously.
Ex post:
 Information: Each student i knows the true preferences of all other students (i.e. Pi and
P i) as well as the \constructed preferences" for all schools, (i.e. fsgs2S). Implicitly
then, he knows both fSCsgs2S and fLsgs2S.
 Eciency: For each vector of submitted preferences e P and school preferences ; the
mechanism returns a deterministic matching. As such, eciency is measured in terms
of the true rank of the school to which each student is matched.
Interim:
 Information: Each student i knows Pi and P i, as well as fSCsgs2S, but remains ignorant
of fLsgs2S. Essentially, the Interim view is just the Ex post view before the lotteries are
drawn.
 Eciency: For each vector of submitted preferences e P and school preferences SC,
the mechanism returns a matching that depends on what lotteries are drawn. From
each student's perspective this induces a distribution over nal matches. Eciency is
measured in terms of these distributions.
Ex ante:
 Information: Each student knows their own preference, Pi, but now only knows the
distribution of the other students preferences' (i.e. '). Students still know fSCsgs2S
and remain ignorant of fLsgs2S.
 Eciency: For each vector of submitted preferences e P and school preferences SC, the
mechanism returns a matching that depends on what lotteries are drawn. For each
student, uncertainty about both the lottery draws and the true preferences of the other
students induces a distribution over nal matches. Eciency is measured in terms of
these distributions.
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The literature on school choice mechanisms so far has mostly dealt with complete information,
and hence the ex post view. In this paper we will also study school choice under incomplete
information, especially the ex ante case, which will cast the properties of the Boston mechanism
in a new light. We also look at the ex ante view because it seems to provide a more realistic
amount of information to students. Additionally, we consider the ex ante conception of
eciency to be a natural t for a policy maker's objective. Since they must decide on
mechanisms that will be in place for several years, they might be more concerned with how
the mechanism performs relative to the distribution underlying any given year's realized set
of preferences rather than relative to those realized preferences themselves.
2.2 Two school choice mechanisms
We consider two mechanisms which are currently being used for school choice in the U.S.
The rst is based on the Deferred Acceptance algorithm and has been introduced in Boston
and New York City schools by Abdulkadiro glu et al. (2006, 2008).
The Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DA)
 Step 1: Students apply to their rst choice school. Schools reject the lowest-ranking
students in excess of their capacity. All other oers are held temporarily.
 Step t: If a student is rejected in Step t 1, he applies to the next school on their rank-
order list. Schools consider both new oers and the oers held from previous rounds.
They reject the lowest ranked students in excess of their capacity. All other oers are
held temporarily.
 STOP: The algorithm ends when no rejections are issued. Each school is matched to
the students it is holding at the end.
Important properties of the Deferred Acceptance algorithm are summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition (Deferred Acceptance) Suppose students have strict preferences over schools,
and schools have either weak (SCs) or strict (s) priorities over students, which are used
as the schools' submitted rank orders. Consider the preference revelation game induced
by the Deferred Acceptance algorithm. Then:
1. It is a dominant strategy for students to submit their true preferences (Dubins and
Freedman 1981, Roth 1982a).
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2. The outcome achieved by DA is stable. Furthermore, it is the stable matching
that all students prefer, known as the student-optimal stable matching (Gale and
Shapley 1962).
The second mechanism we consider is based on a specic priority algorithm, rst described
as the Boston algorithm by Abdulkadiro glu and S onmez (2003).
The Boston Algorithm
 Step 1: Students apply to their rst choice school. Schools reject the lowest-ranking
students in excess of their capacity. All other oers become permanent matches. School
capacities are adjusted accordingly.
 Step t : Is a student is rejected in Step t   1, she applies to the next school on her
rank-order list. Schools reject the lowest ranked students in excess of their capacity. All
other oers become permanent matches. School capacities are adjusted accordingly.
 STOP: The algorithm stops when all students have been matched or when all schools
have been lled.
Note that in, contrast to the Deferred Acceptance algorithm, applications in the Boston
algorithm are permanently accepted in each step, as opposed to only tentatively held. In the
Boston algorithm, acceptance fails to be deferred until it is clear that no student with a higher
priority will apply at a later step.
This immediately suggests that the Boston algorithm is manipulable, that is, truthful
preference revelation is not a dominant strategy (as it is under DA). Even so, in complete
information environments, the set of possible equilibrium matchings in a Boston mechanism
can be compared to the outcome under DA via the following proposition.
Proposition (Boston - Ergin and S onmez, 2006) Consider the preference revelation game
where each student i submits a preference report, e Pi, to a direct revelation mechanism
that assigns a matching through the Boston algorithm. If all students submit their re-
ports from the ex post perspective (that is under complete information), then the set of
Nash equilibrium outcomes of this game equals the set of stable matchings under the true
student preferences, P, and the strict constructed school preferences, .
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Consider the set of matchings stable relative to the schools' \constructed preferences".7 DA
chooses the element of this set that all students prefer most, while Boston is only constrained
to choose some element of this set (in equilibrium). For any student, the equilibrium outcome
under Boston in a complete information, ex post environment can only be, at best, as good
as the one obtained under DA. Once more, there is no reason to favor Boston over DA.
The next example shows that with incomplete information, the resultant outcomes of
Boston and DA mechanism may cease to be easily comparable (another example of this can
be found in Ergin and S onmez (2006)). This environment will be one of the treatments in our
experiment.
The correlated environment There are three schools { Best (1), Second (2) and Third
(3). Best has two seats (qbest = 2), while the other schools only have one. There are
two types of students, called \Top", and \Average"; three students are Top, and two are
Average. All students have the same von Neumann-Morgenstern payos over schools.
Table I
School Best Second Third No School
Seats 2 1 1  
Payo 100 67 25 0
Each school prefers a Top over an Average student (this distinction forms SC), and
each school has an independently drawn uniform lottery to order students of the same
priority class.
The previous proposition shows that in the complete information environment, the Nash
equilibrium outcome is a stable matching. Since the Correlated environment only has one
stable matching, we then know that this matching must be the unique complete information
Nash equilibrium outcome. One set of supporting strategies is the following: The two Top
students with the best lottery numbers at Best rank it rst, while the third Top student ranks
Second rst. The Average student who has the better lottery number at Third ranks it rst,
7Remember that the only meaningful \preferences" of school s are embodied in the weak ordering SCs,
which reprents privileges which lawmakers have extended to students. The \constructed preferences" include
the lotteries, and hence include many strict preferences that are merely artifacts of the need to break ties. As
such, stability relative to  is a concept with many more constraints than stability relative to SC. Hence,
the set of matchings that are stable relative to  is a subset of the set of matchings that are stable relative to
SC.
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and the last Average student submits arbitrary preferences, as he will not receive any school.
This is also the matching that results under the Deferred Acceptance algorithm.
Under Boston, this outcome ceases to be achievable in equilibrium when lottery numbers
are not known; in fact, when participants are risk-neutral, there is a unique pure strategy
Bayesian Nash equilibrium:
Proposition 1 (Correlated Environment) In the Correlated environment, consider the
preference revelation game induced by the Boston mechanism where students have to
report preferences without knowing the lottery draws. If agents are not too risk-averse,
there is a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which the three Top students are matched
to the seats at Best and Third, one Average student is matched with school Second and
one Average student is unmatched. The outcome is achieved by the following strategies
(where x, y, and z are arbitrary):
1. Top students submit preferences (1;3;x):
2. Average students submit preferences (2;y;z):
The proof is in the Appendix. The equilibrium of Proposition 1 entails two types of manipu-
lations. Top students need to misreport their second choice school, submitting school Third
instead of school Second. We call this type of manipulation \skipping the middle". Average
students need to truncate their preferences from the top, submitting school Second as their
most preferred school. We call this type of manipulation \skipping the top". Note that,
relative to DA, the Average students are, in expectation, better o, while the Top students
are, in expectation, worse o.
2.3 Efficiency properties of Boston and DA
The Correlated environment, which we use in our experiment, shows that it is possible
that some students benet from the Boston algorithm, while others are harmed (see also
Ergin and S onmez (2003)). There is, however, no existing account of a case in which the
Boston algorithm can produce uniformly better outcomes than DA in the sense of rst-order
stochastic dominance.8 This is not altogether surprising, since, from the ex post perspective,
there does not exist a matching, stable or not, that every student strictly prefers to the
student-optimal stable matching relative to SC (see Roth 1982 for strict student preferences,
8We focus here on ordinal preferences, as students, in general, submit ordinal rankings. When cardi-
nal preferences are considered, and eciency is measured as the sum of student welfares, then Boston may
dominate DA in the Interim case, see Abdulkadiro glu, Che, Yasuda (2008) and Miralles (2008).
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and Abdulkadiro glu et al. (forthcoming) for weak student preferences). While DA does not
always yield the student-optimal matching relative to SC, it does so sometimes when SC is
weak and always when SC is strict.
Furthermore, Pathak and S onmez (2008) show that in a complete information environment,
when there are both sophisticated students (who best-respond to others' strategies) and sincere
students (who simply submit their true preferences), the sophisticated students may prefer the
Boston outcome to the DA outcome, while sincere students may be worse o under Boston.
With these combined ndings { the lack of strategy-proofness, the failure to achieve better
outcomes, and the possibility of hurting less sophisticated participants { it might seem that
market designers would be better o to eliminate the Boston algorithm from their toolbag
altogether.
One objective of this paper is to show that the Boston algorithm can have some attractive
features and can potentially outperform the Deferred Acceptance algorithm in specic envi-
ronments.9 In order to show this, we turn to a case in which there is non-trivial uncertainty
about student preferences. In a very symmetric environment, truth-telling can be an equi-
librium even under the Boston mechanism (and, of course, it remains a dominant strategy
equilibrium under DA). The following example shows how in the incomplete information case,
ex ante, every student may strictly prefer Boston to DA. More generally, though, this example
points out a potentially more important weakness of strategy-proofness: it is inherently tied
to a realized set of student preferences and hence, to a realized school choice problem. In
general school choice problems, insisting on strategy-proofness may prevent trade-os across
dierent preference realizations which, ex ante, could benet each student. Sometimes these
trade-os may even be realized without distorting straightforward behavior. Truth-telling can
still be an equilibrium strategy even if it is not a dominant strategy.
Example Suppose there are three students, i;j and k, and two one-seat schools, an art
school and a science school. Each student is equally likely to have the science or art
school as his rst choice. Note that, as we discuss below, in this environment, it is a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium (and in a sense,as we will see, the unique equilibrium) for all
students to report preferences truthfully under Boston. Obviously, truth-telling remains
9Far from advocating widespread use of the Boston mechanism, we are instead attempting to point out that
mechanisms that are not strategy-proof can yield signicantly better results in some environments. Showing
preference to a student who ranks a school rst over a student who ranks it fth necessarily eliminates
strategy-proofness, but it also allows the mechanism to give a more ecient outcome (so long as truth-telling
is implemented in equilibrium).
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a dominant strategy under Deferred Acceptance.
Suppose schools use a universal lottery, so that we can order students according to their
lottery number as Students 1, 2, and 3. The outcome under the Deferred Acceptance
algorithm is that Student 1 receives his rst choice school, while Student 2 has a 1=2
chance of receiving either her rst or second choice school, depending on whether her
preferences are dierent from or the same as Student 1's. Student 3 will always be
unmatched. Since all students are equally likely to be either Student 1; 2 or 3; the
expected outcome distribution of any student can be calculated by averaging down the
columns of the following table.
Deferred Acceptance
Lottery rank First choice Second choice No school
1 1 0 0
2 1=2
1=2 0
3 0 0 1
Average 1=2
1=6
1=3
Under the Boston algorithm, Student 1 still receives his rst choice school, and Student 2
still receives her rst choice school whenever her preferences are dierent from Student
1's. The Boston algorithm behaves dierently through the rest of the table though.
Suppose Student 2 has the same preferences as Student 1: If Student 3 has dierent
preferences, then Student 3 receives his rst choice school, and Student 2 receives no
school. Only if Student 3 also has the same preferences does Student 2 receives his second
choice school. Each of these events is equally likely; hence, the expected outcome can
be calculated as follows.
Boston
Lottery rank First choice Second choice No school
1 1 0 0
2 1=2
1=4
1=4
3 1=4 0 3=4
Average 1=2 + 1=12
1=6   1=12
1=3
Clearly, the distribution under Boston rst-order stochastically dominates the distribu-
tion under DA, that is, in this environment, when students play equilibrium strategies,
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every student is ex ante strictly better o under the Boston mechanism.10
The reason for our nding is that the Boston mechanism eectively eliminates \bad" draws
from the support of the lottery. Say that we have two artists and one scientist who are drawn
by the lottery in just that order. Under DA, one artist will get the art school and the other
will get the science school, leaving the scientist unmatched. In a sense, this is a bad outcome,
as it gives one student her rst choice and the other his second choice. A better outcome is
to give two students their rst choice, which is accomplished by giving the art school seat to
an artist and the science school seat to the scientist. This is just what the Boston mechanism
prescribes in our environment. Generally, any lottery draw that is of the form (artist, artist,
scientist) or (scientist, scientist, artist) is suboptimal in the sense we just described. If a
planner using DA proposed to remove those orderings from the support of the lottery draw
for these preference realizations, any student would agree to the proposal ex ante, as it would
make him or her better o. This is because there are just as many (scientist, scientist, artist)
draws as there are (artist, artist, scientist) draws. In our environment, Boston implements
this planner's proposal.
Finally, note that this result does not carry through to either the interim or the ex post
worlds. In both, which mechanism is preferred depends on the realization of preferences. For
instance, suppose students knew that there were two artists and only one scientist. From
the interim view, the artists would strictly prefer that DA be used, while the scientist would
strictly prefer that Boston be used. If instead we had two scientists and one artist, these
conclusions would be reversed. In the ex post world, when the lottery draws an ordering of
the form (artist, artist, scientist), under Boston, the second artist would report himself as a
scientist to avoid being unmatched. The dominance of Boston over DA in our environment is
driven by incomplete information about the realized student preferences.
For the experiment, we will use a similar, but slightly more complicated environment. To
discuss incentive properties in this new environment, we rst introduce a denition and a
proposition. A strategy in a preference revelation game is called a preference permutation
if, for each preference realization, the student submits the same permutation of his true
preferences to the mechanism.
Proposition 2 (Truthtelling in Boston) Consider an incomplete information environment,
in which all schools are equally large (i.e. qs  q for each s): Furthermore, assume that
10Note that this is a rst-order stochastic dominance; hence students prefer Boston for all cardinal prefer-
ences that correspond to their ordinal preferences.
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preferences of all students are independently drawn from a uniform distribution over the
set of all possible rank orderings over S. Then, truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equi-
librium of the preference revelation game induced by the Boston algorithm when viewed
from the ex ante perspective. Furthermore, truth-telling is the unique Bayesian Nash
equilibrium where all students use preference permutations.
See the Appendix for a proof. To compare the expected outcomes under Boston and DA,
note that it is obvious that the Boston mechanism gives more students their submitted rst
choice school. Whenever students submit their preferences truthfully, this means that more
students will receive their true rst choices under Boston than under DA.
The Uncorrelated environment There are ve students and four one-seat schools. The
preferences of all students are drawn independently from the uniform distribution over
all possible orderings of the set of schools, S. All lotteries are drawn from the uniform
distribution over all possible orderings of the students. SC is indierent between all
students, i.e. there is no longer any Top/Average distinction.
In this environment, we can compare the theoretical outcome distributions of the students
under Boston and DA, assuming a single lottery (DA-SL).11 Note that using multiple lotteries
would aect the outcome of DA but not of Boston. Table II shows each student's expected
probability of matching with her rst choice, second choice, etc.
Table II
Mechanism Boston (Cumul.) DA-SL (Cumul.)
First choice 0:610 0:500
Second choice 0:117 (0:727) 0:167 (0:667)
Third choice 0:055 (0:782) 0:083 (0:750)
Fourth choice 0:018 (0:800) 0:050 (0:800)
No School 0:200 (1:000) 0:200 (1:000)
The cumulative columns make it clear that the ex ante distribution under Boston rst-order
stochastically dominates the distribution under DA.
While the Boston mechanism may in theory generate outcomes that surpass those of DA,
this may not be the case in practice. It could be that truth-telling rates are much lower when
11These calculations assume truth-telling, which is a dominant strategy under DA and a Bayesian Nash
strategy under Boston.
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truth-telling is only a Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy instead of a dominant strategy.
Whether the potential gains of a Boston mechanism can be realized in practice remains,
therefore, an empirical question.
3 The Experiment
We have two aims for the experiment. The rst is to provide a clean empirical test of whether
agents manipulate their preferences under the Boston algorithm and, if so, how. Two other
papers have addressed this question. Chen and S onmez (2006) have subjects play a one-
shot preference revelation game under either Boston or DA. Additionally, participants in their
experiment know neither the preferences of other students nor the distribution that was used to
generate those preferences. As a result, equilibrium strategies cannot be computed. The paper
instead focuses on how students respond to a large and complex school choice environment,
which has many students vying for seats in schools that are distinguished by being either
small or large and either specialized or general interest. They analyze whether students use
heuristics, such as applying to small schools or large schools, instead of truth-telling.12 Pais
and Pint er (2008) follow the same approach. In their experiments students know all students'
preferences or know only their own preferences, remaining ignorant of the distribution from
which the other students' preferences are drawn. Their paper, like Chen and S onmez (2006),
also uses a one-shot game. In contrast we run a repeated game to allow for learning.13 We also
focus on an environment in which we can compute the Bayesian Nash equilibrium so that we
can compare submitted strategies to the equilibrium prediction, allowing us to detect whether
agents manipulate strategies optimally or whether they make \mistakes". This simpler design
also allows us to analyze which deviations from equilibrium may be more common.
Testing whether and how agents manipulate their preferences under the Boston algorithm
is dicult to address in the eld since the true preferences of students are unobserved. The
only empirical paper along these lines thus far is Abdulkadiro glu et al. (2006), which analyzes
submitted preferences under the Boston algorithm. They nd some evidence of potentially
12Interestingly, in the DA mechanism, they found truthtelling rates of only 55% and 72%. Pais and Pint er
(2008) found truthtelling rates of 67% in the DA mechanism.
13This allows us to see whether behavior remains stable and whether participants may eventually learn
to manipulate in a Boston mechanism and report truthfully in a DA mechanism. While parents in general
particpate in school choice mechanisms only once, they often draw from the experiences of other parents,
and many districts have school choice mechanisms at several points in a child's education. In using multiple
rounds, we also follow the tradition of two-sided matching experiments, see Kagel and Roth (1999),  Unver
(2001), McKinney, Niederle and Roth (2005).
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sub-optimal behavior, albeit through indirect inference. The advantage of an experiment is
that we know the participants' true preferences directly.
The second aim of our experiment is to explore environments in which the Boston mecha-
nism provides arguably better outcomes for students than DA. Here, having many preference
realizations is crucial, as the dominance of Boston over DA is driven by allowing for trade-
os across preference realizations. The one caveat from our theoretical analysis was that
truth-telling can only be implemented as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy under Boston,
while it is implemented as a dominant strategy under DA. It remains, therefore, an empirical
question whether the theoretical gains of a Boston mechanism can be realized in practice.
3.1 Correlated environment
Both incomplete information environments that we use in our experiment consist of ve
students vying for four school seats. Since we have already introduced both environments, we
limit ourselves here to a quick summary of the environments and the behavior we expect to
observe under Boston and DA.
In the rst environment, the Correlated environment, all students have the same prefer-
ences, and the only uncertainty is over the draw of the lotteries. There are only three schools:
Best, Second, and Third. Best has two seats, while Second and Third are one-seat schools.
Participants are paid according to their match as follows (payos are in points, each of which
is worth 1.5 cents):
Correlated payoffs
School Best Second Third No School
Seats 2 1 1  
Payo 100 67 25 0
Of the ve students, three are Top, and two are Average. Each school prefers a Top over
an Average student (this is the SC ordering). Furthermore, each school independently draws
a uniform lottery to order students of the same SC class.14 Equilibrium behavior under our
two mechanisms is as follows:
Deferred acceptance: Under DA, it is a dominant strategy to submit preferences truthfully.
The outcome is thus for the two Tops with the best lottery draws to get seats at Best,
14For a discussion on using single (universal) versus multiple lotteries (one for each school) see Abdulka-
diro glu et al. (forthcoming).
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the other Top to get a seat at Second, and for the Average with the best lottery draw
at Third to get a seat there. The other Average remains unmatched.
Boston: The unique pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies are for Top students
to submit preferences (1;3;x); and for Average students to submit preferences (2;y;z),
where x, y, and z are arbitrary. Hence Top students must \skip the middle", while
Average students must \skip the top". The outcome is for the two Tops with the best
lottery draws to get seats at Best, the other Top to get a seat at Third, and for the
Average with the best lottery draw at Second to get a seat there. The other Average
remains unmatched.
Comparing the strategies and outcomes under Boston and DA can show whether stu-
dents manipulate preferences in the correlated environment when the mechanism calls for
manipulation. Furthermore, the experiment can show whether students will learn the optimal
manipulations, and whether one kind of manipulation seems easier to learn than the other.
3.2 Uncorrelated environment
In the Uncorrelated environment, there are ve students, and four one-seat schools. Each
student has independently drawn preferences over the four schools, where all possible pref-
erence proles are equally likely. The payos depend on a participant's true ranking of the
school to which they are matched; hence, it is possible for two students both to both be paid
the highest amount if they have dierent rst choice schools. Also note that, while the specic
payos are close to the ones used in the correlated environment, the equilibrium predictions
for the Uncorrelated environment are not sensitive to their cardinal values. Subject payos
in the uncorrelated environment are as follows:
Uncorrelated payoffs
School 1st Choice 2nd Choice 3rd Choice 4th Choice No School
Seats 1 1 1 1  
Payo 110 90 67 25 0
For the schools' preferences, we use a dierent lottery for each school, that is, they too
have random preferences over students, uniformly drawn from the set of all possible rankings.15
15We chose multiple lotteries mostly for simplicity. Note, however, that in a Deferred Acceptance algorithm,
using a single lottery versus multiple lotteries may have an eect. While outcomes cannot be directly compared,
it seems that on average using a single lottery provides somewhat better outcomes for students than using
multiple lotteries. In our nal eciency comparison, we will take this into account.
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Expected behavior is as follows:
DA: Truth-telling is a dominant strategy.
Boston: Truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy.
As a reminder, in equilibrium, Boston rst-order stochastically dominates Deferred Accep-
tance (see Table II). This environment allows us to test whether truth-telling rates are higher
under DA or under Boston and whether the theoretical ex ante gains of Boston over DA in
the truth-telling equilibrium can be realized in practice.
3.3 Experimental design
We ran four sessions under the Deferred Acceptance mechanism and seven sessions under
the Boston mechanism. In each session, ve Stanford undergraduate students played for 15
periods in the Correlated environment, during which players kept their role, as either a Top
or an Average student. Then, after a pause to learn about the new environment, they played
another 15 periods in the Uncorrelated environment.16 Within a session, the mechanism was
held constant, and each participant participated in only one session. The experiment was
conducted on computers, using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). At the start of a session, we read
instructions concerning the environment and the mechanism, and we checked each player's
understanding by having them solve the outcome of a test environment, where participants
were given submitted preferences and had to determine the outcome of the relevant mechanism.
We repeatedly checked understanding by correcting and explaining outcomes through each
subsequent step of the algorithm. Participants earned 1.5 cents for every payo point and
were paid based on their cumulative earnings over all 30 periods of the session.
4 Results from the correlated environment
4.1 Manipulation in the Boston Mechanism
For the duration of this section, we will focus on the last ve of the fteen periods of
the Correlated environment. There is, however, not much change between the rst ve and
the last ve periods, and most results are qualitatively the same were we to consider all 15
periods.
16In our design, participants always see the Correlated environment before they see the Uncorrelated en-
vironment. This may lead to less truth-telling in the Boston Uncorrelated environment, and hence seems to
work against what we are trying to show.
17EX ANTE EFFICIENCY IN SCHOOL CHOICE MECHANISMS
We start our analysis of behavior under the Boston mechanism by focusing on who receives
what outcome. Table III shows, for each student type, the fraction of matches at each school.
The predicted equilibrium outcome is also included for comparison.
Table III: Boston
Proportion of seats received by dierent participants
School Best Second Third No School
Top 0:67 0:11 0:05 0:17
Top Equil. 2=3 0 1=3 0
Average 0:00 0:33 0:43 0:24
Average Equil. 0 1=2 0 1=2
The most striking aspect of the outcome distribution is that Top students who do not
receive a seat at Best sometimes end up unmatched. Average students, in turn, are too often
matched relative to the equilibrium outcome.
To understand these outcomes, we investigate the strategies used by Top and Average
students. First, we consider the distribution of submitted rst choices (see Table IV).
Table IV: Boston
First Choices of Participants
School Best Second Third
Top 0:92 0:07 0:01
Average 0:06 0:67 0:27
The vast majority of strategies submitted by Average students rank some school besides Best
as their rst choice. Analyzing behavior by participant, we nd that 13 out of 14 Average
students manipulate as a primary strategy (we describe a strategy as primary if it is used
at least 80% of the time).17 Not ranking unachievable schools seems to be easy to learn, and
Average students do so almost immediately.
The most popular strategy used by Top students is to rank school Best as their rst
choice. Analyzing behavior by participant, all but one of the Top students ranks Best rst as
a primary strategy (the remaining Top does so 60% of the time).18
When analyzing the second choice of Top students, note that in the last ve rounds, 65.7%
17Eleven (of 14) Average students always skip school Best (that is 5 out of 5 times).
1814 of 21 Top students always rank Best rst. In general, the rst choice of a Top student that is not school
Best is school Second, though once it is school Third.
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of the submitted rankings of Top students are their true rankings.19 We have 13 of 21 Top
participants using truth-telling as their primary strategy, and only 5 of 21 using any sort
of misrepresentation as a primary strategy. The dierence in truth-telling rates between Top
students (65.7%) and Average students (1.5%) provides evidence that students are responding
to the environment.
Average students seem to manipulate their preferences quite often, as is predicted by the
risk-neutral Nash equilibrium. While 67% of Average student strategies correspond to the risk
neutral equilibrium, the same proportion is only 27% for Top students. Furthermore, in all
15 periods and in all seven sessions, we did not observe a single period in which every agent
in the group played risk-neutral Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies.
Even so, this lack of adherence to the risk-neutral equilibrium might be able to be explained
by risk-averse agents. Fortunately, there are instances in the data where behavior can be
unequivocally classied as sub-optimal. One of these is when Top players rank Third as their
rst choice. This happens exactly once in our periods of interest. The other instances where
sub-optimal behavior is identiable occur when all Top students rank Best as their rst choice
and Average students submit rankings such that the second choice of Top students is clearly
constrained by best response. We observe two types of cases like this.
Case 1: One Average student ranks Second rst, and the other Average student does not
rank Third rst; hence, rst round choices are f1;1;1g for Top students and f2;1=2g
for Average students. Furthermore, neither of the Average students ranks school Best
second. In this case the best response of Top students is to rank school Third second:
the strategy (1;3;x) yields expected payos of 2
3 100+ 1
3 25 as compared to only 2
3 100
for a strategy of (1;2;x).20
Case 2: One Average student ranks school Third rst, and the other does not rank school
Second rst, and neither Average student ranks school Best as their second choice;
hence, rst choices are f1;1;1g, f3;1=3g: In this case the best response of Top students
is (1;2;x) which yields 2
3 100+ 1
3 67 as compared to (1;3;x) which yields only 2
3 100.
19In comparison only 1% of Average student strategies are truthful preference revelations; in fact only one
Average student truthfully submitted in the last ve periods (and then, only once). Furthermore, there does
not seem to be much of a trend in the data: in the rst 5 periods, truth-telling rates for Tops and Averages
are 69% and 6%, respectively.
20Note that in the last ve periods, only three strategies of Average students have school Best ranked as
their second choice. Two of these are nonetheless included in Case 1. The other is included in Case 2. We
include these because this does not aect the best response of Top students, but only how much they gain by
doing so.
19EX ANTE EFFICIENCY IN SCHOOL CHOICE MECHANISMS
Case 1 and Case 2 are the only two cases that are present in the data in which Top students
have strong incentives to rank either Second or Third as their second choice, given that they
ranked Best as their rst choice. We now study sessions in which a large fraction (4 out of
5, labeled Frequency 4/5 in the table) or at least the majority (3 out of 5, labeled Frequency
3/5) of periods are either in Case 1 or Case 2 and in which remaining periods do not fall
into those cases. More succinctly, we focus on sessions in which students weakly best respond
by submitting (1;2;x) or (1;3;x) in all ve periods, and, in 4 (or 3) of those periods, this
behavior is a strict best response. Table V below shows the number of sessions that fall into
these categories, the best responses of Top students in those sessions (T-BR), and whether Top
students submit truthfully (i.e. submit (1;2) (Truth)) or best respond as a primary strategy
(BR).
Table V
Case T-BR Frequency # sessions Truth BR
1 (1;3) 4=5 2 5=6 0=6
1 (1;3) 3=5 2 2=6 2=6
2 (1;2) 4=5 1 3=3 3=3
We nd that the proportion of students that use truth-telling (1;2;x), or manipulation
(1;3;x) as a primary strategy is largely independent of what the best response would have
been; in fact, most Top students just truthfully submit their preferences as a primary strategy.
As a result, 9 of the 15 Top students analyzed above incur losses in earnings that are higher
than 5%. There seems to be little evidence that Top students use truth-telling because it is a
best response in their session, but rather it seems that \skipping the middle" (i.e. submitting
(1;3;x)) is simply dicult to learn.
When analyzing empirical data concerning submitted strategies under the Boston mecha-
nism, it is a lack of manipulation of this sort (\skipping the middle") that may be the most
identiable, even if true preferences of students are not known. Indeed, Abdulkadiro glu et
al. (2006) nd some indirect evidence that students sometimes rank schools below their rst
choice that are expected to be lled in the rst step of the algorithm.21
To summarize, the dierences in truth-telling rates across type conrm that participants
react to the environment, albeit not optimally. There remains the possibility, however, that
Average students would not apply to Best (i.e. \skip the top"), even under DA. Furthermore,
21If a school is lled in the rst step of a Boston mechanism, then no student who has not ranked the school
rst has a chance of matching to it. If a student believes that a school will ll in the rst step of the algorithm,
then it is a clear mistake to rank it lower than rst.
20EX ANTE EFFICIENCY IN SCHOOL CHOICE MECHANISMS
as we have seen, Top students who should be manipulating their preference reports under
Boston in fact use truth-telling as their most common strategy. It is possible that the behavior
we observe may not be thoughtful manipulation due to the Boston mechanism but instead is
just a reaction to the Correlated environment. These concerns can be addressed by analyzing
truth-telling under DA in the same Correlated environment.
4.2 Boston versus DA
The outcome in the last ve periods under the DA mechanism is given by Table VI, which
shows for each student type the fraction of matches at each school.
Table VI: DA
Proportion of seats received by dierent participants
School Best Second Third No School
Top 0:67 0:33 0:00 0:00
Average 0:00 0:00 0:50 0:50
The outcome corresponds exactly to the equilibrium: the three Top students receive seats
at Best and Second, while the Average students either receive a seat at Third or remain
unmatched. Note that under DA, when compared to the Boston mechanism, Top students
are better o and Average students are worse o. We begin our investigation of the strategies
used by the subjects by looking at their submitted rst choices (Table VII).
Table VII: DA
First Choices of Participants
School Best Second Third
Top 1 0 0
Average :70 :05 :25
Sucient conditions for the outcome under DA to yield the stable match constrain Top
students to submit preferences (1;2;x), while only constraining Average students to rank
Third above No School. In spite of the fact that truth-telling is not a strict best response,
we observe that 92% of Top student strategies and 63% of Average student strategies are
truth-telling.22
To compare truth-telling rates between the Boston and the DA mechanism, we run Mann-
22Note that under DA, 11 out of 12 Top and 4 out of 8 Average students use truth-telling as a primary
strategy. In comparison, under Boston the numbers were 13 out of 21 for Top students and 0 out of 14 for
Average students.
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Whitney tests on session averages, which gives us 7 Boston data points and 4 DA data points.
Running the test for the two student types, we nd that both Top students (p = 0:07) and
Average students (p < 0:01) are signicantly more likely to use truth-telling strategies under
DA than under Boston. This shows that the manipulations of both Average and Top players
under the Boston mechanism are not due to the environment alone, but rather are driven by
the combination of environment and mechanism. Nonetheless, as the outcome of the Boston
mechanism showed, participants are not best responding even in this simple environment.
5 Results from the uncorrelated environment
Now we move on to the Uncorrelated environment. Recall that, in this environment, under
the Boston mechanism, truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy, while under DA,
truth-telling is of course still a dominant strategy. If participants use truth-telling strategies,
then we expect the Boston outcome to rst-order stochastically dominate that of DA.
5.1 Boston versus DA: Strategies
To compare strategies between the Boston and Deferred Acceptance mechanisms, rst
note that basically all submitted strategies rank all schools.23 The proportion of truth-telling
strategies is 58% under the Boston mechanism, compared with 66% under DA. This dierence
is not signicant: a Mann-Whitney test across mechanisms, comparing mean truth-telling
rates in each session, yields a p-value of 0:70 (n = 11).24
To address what manipulations are submitted, we check truth-telling rates at each ranked
position, that is, how often a participants's submitted kth-ranked school corresponds to his
true kth-ranked school (see Table VIII).
23Only one student, for three rounds at the beginning of the Uncorrelated environment, failed to rank all
schools.
24Truth-telling rates declined somewhat from the rst ve periods to the last. The rates in the rst ve
periods were 74% under DA and 61% under Boston.
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Table VIII: Uncorrelated
Boston DA
1st. 2nd. 3rd. 4th: 1st. 2nd. 3rd. 4th:
Rank 1 0:76 0:22 0:01 0:01 0:74 0:19 0:07 0:00
Rank 2 0:16 0:61 0:13 0:10 0:14 0:69 0:15 0:02
Rank 3 0:06 0:07 0:80 0:07 0:07 0:11 0:77 0:05
Rank 4 0:02 0:10 0:06 0:82 0:05 0:01 0:01 0:93
Note that there is little discernable dierence across mechanisms, as predicted by equilib-
rium. Furthermore, note that manipulations tend to move a school up one or down one from
its true ranking. While participants are not exactly truth-telling, they're not manipulating
in an extreme way either.
5.2 Boston versus DA: Outcomes
We want to compare the outcomes in terms of how often a participant receives her kth-
ranked school. We have seen that, over all possible preference realizations, the Boston mecha-
nism should rst-order stochastically dominate DA. Even so, there are a total of 244 possible
preference realizations for students, while we draw only 7  15 realizations under Boston and
4  15 under DA. If we only analyze the last ve periods instead of all fteen, we further
cut the number of observations over which we average by a factor of three. We will therefore
expand our analysis to include all fteen periods. The results when restricting ourselves to
the last ve periods are similar, though sometimes only signicant in a one-sided test.
The DA mechanism which we ran in the lab uses multiple lotteries; however, recent work
by Abdulkadiro glu et al. (forthcoming) provides simulations that indicate that DA under a
universal lottery can in some environments produce a better ex ante outcome distribution
than DA under multiple lotteries. Note that in both cases, truth-telling remains a dominant
strategy. In our uncorrelated environment, we know that Boston theoretically dominates DA
using a single lottery. We therefore compute the outcome had we used a single lottery in the
laboratory. We do this by taking the participants' submitted preferences and using the lottery
draw for one of the schools as the universal lottery. Since we have four of these lotteries (one
per school) for each session, we use each of them as a universal lottery and then average the
resultant outcome distributions.25
Earlier, we mentioned that we take only a small sample of the possible preference realiza-
25We cannot take each of the lotteries as a data point, as they are not independent of each other.
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tions in our experiment. As a result, it may be that the dominance results established for
the entire distribution over preferences might not hold for the particular preferences that were
drawn in the lab. As such, we calculate the counterfactual outcome that would have occurred
had truth-telling rates been 100%. In a sense, this is a measure of how much advantage Boston
theoretically could have had over DA. The gures always show not the proportion at which
participants receive the school they merely ranked rst, second, etc., but the proportion at
which participants receive a school that corresponds to their actual rst choice school, second
choice school, etc.
Figure 1 shows, for each true school rank, the probability with which a student receives
either a school of that rank or a more preferred school. We plot the mean outcomes relative
to participants' actual preferences for Boston and DA, and also for the single-lottery DA
counterfactual, which we denote by DA-SL. This is the outcome we would have observed had
the participants been 100% truthful. Since this was not the case, Figure 2 shows the outcomes
using the participants' submitted preferences.
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Figure 1: CDF of Outcomes with 100% truth-telling
When looking at the 100% truth-telling outcomes (Figure 1), we nd that the Boston
mechanism yields signicantly more true rst choice outcomes than either the DA mechanism
(p < 0:01) or the DA-SL mechanism (p < 0:01).26 When we compare the proportion of
26We use Mann-Whithney test, where the session mean is a data point, that is, we have 7 data points for
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Figure 2: CDF of Outcomes with submitted preferences
students who receive either their true rst or second choice, once more Boston has signicantly
higher proportions than either the DA mechanism or the DA-SL mechanism (p < 0:01 in both
cases).27
Figure 2 shows the actual outcome distribution observed in the lab. As we change from
100% truth-telling to submitted preferences, the cumulative outcomes seem to shift down-
wards, but do not squeeze closer together that much. This implies that, while deviation from
100% truth-telling decreases eciency, it does not erase the gains to be made from switching
to Boston from either version of DA.
A signicantly larger fraction of students receive their true rst choice even with submitted
preferences when the Boston rather than DA (p < 0:01), or DA-SL (p = 0:06), is used.28 When
we compared the proportion of students who receive either their rst or second choice, Boston
once more signicantly outperforms both the DA (p < 0:01) and DA-SL (p = 0:09).29
To summarize we found that in the uncorrelated environment truth-telling rates between
Boston, and 4 for DA and DA-SL. When we only consider the last ve periods, the p-values are 0:01 and less
than 0:01, respectively.
27When we look at the last ve rounds only, the dierence between Boston and DA is still signicant at
p < 0:01; while the one between Boston and DA-SL is not (p = 0:12).
28When we only consider the last ve periods, Boston still gives a higher fraction of participants their rst
choice. The dierence is signicant when compared to DA (p < 0:01), though not when compared to DA-SL,
(p = 0:18). Note that a one-sided test would yield signicance in all the two-sided tests that we have discussed.
29When we consider only the last ve preiods, the p values are < 0:01 and 0:03 respectively.
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Boston and DA were very similar, in spite of the fact that truth-telling is a dominant strategy
under DA and only a Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy under Boston. A plausible expla-
nation is that truth-telling holds special sway as a focal point.30 Regardless, it seems that
the theoretical advantages of Boston over DA (in our specialized environment) can indeed be
realized in practice.
6 Eciency: The Ex-Ante View
To compare eciency properties of mechanisms, the matching literature initially focused on
the ex post point of view, taking not only preferences but lottery outcomes as given. When
students not only know each others' preferences and priorities, but also the lotteries of all
the schools, Ergin and S onmez (2006) show that the set of Nash equilibria under the Boston
mechanism is equal to the set of stable matchings. However, the student- proposing DA mech-
anism selects the student-optimal stable matching (when using both student characteristics
and lotteries as real constraints, that is using s SCs  Ls for each school s); hence, the
eciency properties of the Boston mechanism are inferior those of the DA mechanism.
The school choice literature recognized that the outcome of the student-proposing DA
mechanism may be the student-optimal stable outcome given SC  L; but that, when com-
puting eciency, constraints induced by the lottery outcomes L should maybe not be seen as
\real" constraints. Once the outcome of a DA mechanism is evaluated in terms of student
characteristics (SC) only, it may not be a student-optimal stable match. The main issue is
that the lotteries induce additional constraints that might make the student-optimal stable
match relative to SC unstable relative to .
A new wave of papers takes this interim view, that is, continues to take student preferences
as given, but evaluates eciency properties before lotteries (L) are drawn. The main focus
of that literature is to improve upon the DA outcome, since it may not always be a student-
optimal stable match (relative to SC).
Erdil and Ergin (2008) show that there is no strategy-proof mechanism that guarantees
a student-optimal stable matching in the school choice problem in which schools have weak
30This may be why Pais and Pint er (2008) found that in environments in which participants have no
information about how preferences are generated, a large fraction of participants use truth-telling as a strategy.
They found similar truth-telling rates when either a Boston or a DA mechanism was used. One dierence is that
in our environment, participants have information about the underlying preference distribution, which allows
for game-theoretic equilibrium analysis. In a theoretical investigation, Pathak and S onmez (forthcoming) use
truth-telling as the non-equilibrium strategy.
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priorities. Furthermore, they provide an algorithm of stable improvement cycles that improve
on a DA outcome, while maintaining stability relative to SC (though not necessarily L):
Kesten and  Unver (2008), in similar vain, try for a mechanism that is less constrained by L
than the DA mechanism. Abdulkadiro glu, Che and Yasuda (2008) and Miralles (2008) move
a step further, looking at cardinal, rather than ordinal, preferences of students.31
None of these proposed mechanisms is strategy-proof; indeed, Abdulkadiro glu et al. (forth-
coming) show that no mechanisms that Pareto dominate DA are strategy-proof. Furthermore,
they try to empirically estimate the costs of strategy-proofness. Their data are the submitted
preferences in New York and Boston, both of which recently started to use a DA mechanism
(see Abdulkadiro glu, Pathak, Roth, S onmez (2005) and Abdulkadiro glu, Pathak, and Roth
(forthcoming). Starting with an outcome given by the DA mechanism, they use stable im-
provement cycles  a la Erdil and Ergin and top trading cycles, which allow for improvements
that break stability. They nd that the costs of strategy-proofness, while present to some
extent in New York, are not very large in Boston.
In this paper we introduce the ex ante viewpoint. Eciency properties are not assessed
for a given set of preferences, but rather from a perspective where only the distribution of
preferences is common knowledge, and the realized preferences of each student are private
information. This viewpoint may be relevant not only for participating students in an actual
school choice problem, but also for a school board that plans to use a mechanism over many
years. Such a board may be more concerned with achieving consistently good outcomes from
year to year, rather than for a specic realized preference prole. The main eect of this ex
ante viewpoint, is that it allows for trade-os across specic preference realizations.
The canonical example of how this might be advantageous is our highly articial and very
symmetric art and science schools example. In this example, truth-telling is an equilibrium
under the Boston mechanism. Furthermore, the Boston mechanism achieves, for each realiza-
tion, a student-optimal stable match that gives as many students as possible their rst choice.
This outcome rst-order stochastically dominates the DA outcome for each student. Note
that in this example, for any preference realization, DA produces a student-optimal stable
31While DA may yield desired ordinal outcomes, this need not be the case when outcomes are cardinal.
In this case, for specic cardinal preferences they construct an example in which the equilibrium outcome of
a Boston mechanism is superior to a DA outocme, in an environment in which preferences P and student
characetrisctics SC are known, but L is not. The reason is that the equilibrium in a Boston mechanism which
uses strategies that are not truth-telling allows some freedom to students in deciding how to break ties. They
use that approach to put forward their CADA (Choice Augmented DA) mechanism, which basically gives
students the possibility to decide to some extent how to break ties. Miralles (2008) is very similar in spirit.
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outcome, just not always the same as Boston. The reason there is room to improve upon
DA is that the student- optimal stable match is not unique. Furthermore, DA does not select
among these student-optimal stable matching in a way that takes advantage of tradeos across
dierent preference realizations, hence maximizing expected utility ex ante.
The advantages of the Boston mechanism, are most easily seen in the context of the art
and science schools example. If only one student likes the science school the most, that
student should go to the science school, while the two artists should have an equal chance
of receiving the one seat at the art school. Similarly, if there is only one artist, the Boston
mechanism makes sure that the artist can go to the art school, while the two scientists receive
a lottery over the seat in the science school. Since both preference realizations are equally
likely, each student strictly benets ex ante over a mechanism such as DA that treats art and
science students the same when considering to whom it should give the remaining school, be
it the science or the art school. DA may be preferable to the two artists once it is known there
is only one scientist, since they would not want the scientist to receive preferential treatment
over them. However, this is not the case ex ante, when both artists and scientists are equally
likely to be in the minority. Note that the gains of the Boston mechanism are realized when
students report their preferences truthfully, and in an ordinal setting.
The ex ante view and example above also highlight an alternative way to calculate the cost
of strategy-proofness. In the example the DA outcome is always a student-optimal stable
matching (though not necessarily the one that provides as many students as possible with their
rst choice school). Nonetheless, neither Erdil-Ergin nor top trading cycles improvements have
any impact on any allocation reached by a DA mechanism. As such, the method devised by
Abdulkadiro glu et al. (forthcoming) to measure the costs of strategy-proofness would conclude
that in our art and science schools example that there are no costs of strategy-proofness. This
is obviously not the case from the ex ante view, as a student halves his chance to get his
second choice school, and instead increases his chance to receive his rst choice school by the
same amount.32
While the ex ante view has not been used to determine eciency properties before, it has
been used when discussing incentives to manipulate under various matching mechanisms, see
Roth and Rothblum (1999), Ehlers (2008) and Kojima and Pathak (forthcoming). What we
32Note that some ordinal ecient mechanisms such as cake eating at equal speed (see Bogolmania and
Moulin 2001) are also not able to reach the ex ante eciency levels of the Boston mechanism. The reason is
that equal speed cake eating also gives science students a positive probability to attend the art school, even
in the case in which there are two scientists and only one artist. Furthermore, using top trading cycles would
yield the same outcome as DA, and both are equivalent to random serial dictatorship in this example.
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show in this paper is that the ex ante view may be relevant to eciency, and that it changes
what has been the conventional wisdom concerning the Boston mechanism .
7 Conclusions
This paper provides experimental evidence that optimal manipulations in school choice prob-
lems may be hard to achieve even in very simple environments and even when participants
receive a lot of feedback. While parents in general participate in matching mechanisms only
once, or a few times, they may receive information about strategizing from other sources (see
Abdulkadiro glu et al. 2006 and Abdulkadiro glu et al. forthcoming). It also seems that in
actual mechanisms where agents can benet by manipulating, participants can take a few
years to learn to do so (Roth 1990, 1991). In the laboratory we run the experiment for several
periods, showing that behavior seems to stabilize fairly quickly and providing participants
with a chance to learn how to play in such mechanisms. Furthermore, experiments with mul-
tiple periods allow us to compare the outcome under a Boston and DA mechanism in the
Uncorrelated environment, as we can take averages over 15 periods instead of just having only
a single round as a data point in each session.
While other experiments on mechanisms in two-sided matching use that same methodology
(see e.g. Kagel and Roth, 1999, McKinney, Niederle and Roth 2005,  Unver 2001), many school
choice mechanism experiments are played exactly once (Chen and S onmez, 2006, Pais and
Pint er, 2008). The second dierence between this paper and other school choice mechanism
experiments is that participants are always informed about the environment, specically about
how student preferences are generated. This allows us to compute equilibrium behavior and
to compare outcomes to equilibrium predictions.
We nd that participants' strategies react both to the mechanism, and also to the environ-
ment (Correlated and Uncorrelated). Nonetheless, many participants fail to submit optimal
strategies in the Correlated environment under the Boston mechanism. We provide clear evi-
dence that manipulations that call for \skipping the middle" (i.e. leaving out the true second
choice school) are hard to learn. This provides additional support for the suggestive empirical
evidence of Abdulkadiro glu et al. (2006).
Finally, we showed that a Boston mechanism which provides as many students as possible
with their rst choice, may have some very good properties. The problem of the strategy-
proof DA mechanism is actually very well described by an objection raised by education
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ocials in Boston and New York when they were discussing whether to adopt DA (private
communication from Alvin E. Roth and Parag A. Pathak). In a DA mechanism it can be that
at some point in the algorithm two students with the same student characteristics, apply to
the same school, one of whom ranks the school as his rst choice, while the other ranks it late
in his preference list. Under DA it is the lottery number that will decide which of the two
students receives a seat at the school; the ranking is not taken into account at all. This is
the cost of strategy-proofness and is exactly what a Boston mechanism avoids (and why, in
general, truth-telling is not an equilibrium under Boston).
In future work we hope to nd new hybrid mechanisms that can extend some of the
desirable features of the Boston mechanism to more general environments, while keeping
truth-telling as an equilibrium. This paper shows that such a research agenda could have a
large impact on student welfare.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Since Top students have highest priority, there can be no pure strategy
Nash equilibrium where fewer than two Tops rank Best rst. Now, we consider what the other
Top (call her i) could rank rst in equilibrium. Clearly, ranking Third rst is dominated by
ranking Second rst. If she ranks Second rst, the best response of Averages is to rank Third
rst. But if they do this, then i can protably deviate by ranking Best rst and Second
second, since it is clear that Second won't be taken in the rst round of the Boston algorithm.
Thus, it must be that any PSNE has all Tops ranking Best rst. This implies that Averages'
best response is to rank Second rst, and Tops, in turn, best respond by ranking Third second,
as Second will be taken in the rst round of the Boston algorithm. These strategies form a
Nash equilibrium, and since we have ruled out all other PSNE, this one must be unique.
To prove Proposition 2, we will need a few denitions and lemmas.
Denition 1. Consider a submitted rank order vector where school s is ranked kth. Now
consider a new rank order, where, for j < k, the vector is the same from the 1st to (j   1)st
positions but substitutes school s in the jth spot. Mathematically,
r = (r(1);:::;r(j   1);:::;r(k   1);s;:::)
r0 = (r(1);:::;r(j   1);s;r0(j + 1);:::)
(1)
A mechanism is called rank monotonic if the probability of being matched to school s is
weakly higher under r0 than under r, regardless of how preference, priority, and lottery draws
are distributed.
Lemma 2. The Boston mechanism is rank monotonic.
Proof. Consider r and r0 from the previous denition. Also consider any state of the world
(i.e. a vector of lottery draws, priorities, and submitted rank order lists for all students) where
student i submits r and is matched to school s (his kth ranked school). In such a state, school
s is not lled by other students prior to Round k of the Boston algorithm, and student i is not
matched to any school he ranked higher than kth. Hence, if student i had instead submitted
rank-order r0, in the same state of the world, he also would have been matched to s. This
implies that the probability of student i being matching to school s is weakly greater when
he submits r0 instead of r.
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Denition 3. If the probability of student i being matched to his xth ranked school is inde-
pendent of his submitted rank order list, we say that his preference revelation problem exhibits
school anonymity.
Lemma 4. Say there are k schools of quota q and n students. If the submitted preferences of
Ini, as well as all lottery draws are uniformly distributed, then student i's preference revelation
problem exhibits school anonymity.
Proof. Let student i submit a rank order list ri. Let the other students' rank order lists be
given by r i, and the lottery ordering over students by L. Let A be the set of rank order lists
and lottery draws, (r i;L), such that student i is matched to his jth-ranked school, ri(j). Now
let student i submit a dierent rank-order list, r0
i. This induces a permutation mapping , such
that (ri) = r0
i. Now, consider the set of rank-order lists and lottery draws such that student
s is matched to r0
i(j). Call it A0. This set is easily constructed from A. For each (r i;L) 2 A,
by symmetry, we know that ((r i);L) 2 A0.  is a one-to-one mapping, and as such, has
a unique one-to-one inverse. Any distinct element in A must have a corresponding distinct
element in A0, so we conclude that jAj = jA0j, and since our uniformity assumptions tell us that
each element of these sets carries the same probability weight, we conclude Pr(A0) = Pr(A), i.e.
the probability of i being matched with his jth choice school is independent of the rank-order
list that he submits.
Lemma 5. If a student's preference revelation problem exhibits school anonymity, the match-
ing mechanism begin used exhibits rank monotonicity, and x < y, then the probability of
student i being matched to his xth ranked school is weakly greater than the probability of his
being matched to his yth ranked school.
Proof. School anonymity means that the probability of being matched to a school depends
only on what it was ranked. If the probability of being matched to the yth ranked school
were strictly larger than the probability of being matched to the xth ranked school, the rank
monotonicity condition would clearly be violated. Thus, the theorem is proven.
Lemma 6. If all schools are of the same size, and submitted preferences over schools and
lotteries over students are all uniformly drawn, then truth-telling is a best-response.
Proof. Lemma 4 shows that the environment will exhibit school anonymity. The rank mono-
tonicity of the Boston mechanism and school anonymity then tell us that probability of match
to the jth ranked school is independent of the submitted rank-order and decreasing in j. The
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best response in this case is clearly to put the favorite school in the rst slot, the second most
favorite in the second slot, etc. So, truth-telling is a best response.
Denition 7. A strategy is called a preference permutation if it calls for a student
to submit the same permutation of his true preference ordering regardless of what that true
ordering might be.
Now, we are prepared to prove Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 2. If all students but one (call her i) play preference permutations, then
the submitted preferences will be uniformly distributed. Lemma 6 tells us that the best
response to such an environment is truthful revelation. Truth-telling is a preference permu-
tation, hence the only unrestricted equilibrium where all agents play preference permutations
must be the equilibrium where all agents truthfully reveal their preferences.
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